Demand the Advantage. When Is Airpower Central to a Campaign?. by Howard, Ernest G.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2002




kf'■'■• ••< «■•••' 
I ;-t .-'  "• • < 
Demand the Advantage 
When Is Airpower Central 
to a Campaign? 
ERNEST G. HOWARD, LT COL, USAF 
School of Advanced Airpower Studies 
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A 
Approved for Public Release 
Distribution Unlimited 
20000421 037 
»ere QUALITY INSPECTED 3 
Demand the Advantage 
When Is Airpower Central to a Campaign? 
Ernest G. Howard, Lt Col, USAF 
School of Advanced Airpower Studies 
THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF 
THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES, 
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA, FOR COMPLETION OF 
GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS, ACADEMIC YEAR 1991-92. 
Air University Press 
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 
May 1992 
Disclaimer 
Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the 
author, and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, 





ABSTRACT       v 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR vii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ix 
INTRODUCTION     1 
GUADALCANAL CAMPAIGN  .   2 
ANALYSIS—GUADALCANAL  . 14 
SOUTH ATLANTIC WAR (2 APRIL-14 JUNE 1982) 22 
ANALYSIS—SOUTH ATLANTIC WAR .     33 
CONCLUSION 40 
NOTES • • 45 
Illustrations 
Figure 
1 Map of Strategic Situation     4 
2 Organization of Forces for Task One     5 
3 Organization of Landing Force for Task One 6 
Table 
1 Determining the Central Element—Guadalcanal 15 
2 Analyzing Conditions—Guadalcanal 18 
3 Determining the Central Element—South Atlantic 34 
4 Analyzing Conditions—South Atlantic 37 
5 Comparing Conditions of Air Central Phases (Gualalcanal 
and South Atlantic 41 
m 
Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to provide joint planners with a means to determine 
when airpower should be the central element of a campaign. Additionally, this study 
can help planners understand not only when airpower should support surface forces 
but also when the roles of joint forces may be expected to change as the campaign 
progresses. 
To accomplish its purpose, this study provides an analysis of two island campaigns 
in which air, land, and sea forces were employed; the Guadalcanal Campaign of 1942 
and the South Atlantic War of 1982. This study documents and analyzes how the role 
of airpower evolved and changed in relative significance to other forces during course 
of each campaign. 
Finally, this study may provide a useful framework for campaign analysis, in 
general, or for the study of the historical practice of operational art. Future students, 
who wish to research the tensions and complementary effects associated with 
planning joint operations and employing joint forces, may capitalize on the 
framework used in this study to pursue their studies. 
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Introduction 
Since the inception of airpower, military theorists and practitioners have 
debated the proper roles, functions, and uses of airpower.1 Airpower theorists 
have traditionally viewed airpower as a means to conduct air warfare, while 
surface warfare theorists have generally viewed airpower as an adjunct 
means to accomplish land or naval objectives.2 Consequently, officers 
responsible for joint campaign planning do not always fully understand 
airpower's capabilities or the extent to which airpower can influence 
campaign objectives. The planner may need to know the answer to a basic 
question: Under what conditions does airpower become the central element of 
a campaign or a particular phase of a campaign? This study answers that 
question and thereby provides the campaign planner with a means to 
determine when airpower should be the central element of a campaign. 
Additionally, this study will help the planner understand when airpower 
should support surface forces, and when roles of the forces may be expected to 
change as the campaign progresses. 
To find the answer to the question, this study examines the historical 
practice of operational art. Specifically, it analyzes the Guadalcanal 
Campaign of 1942-43 and the South Atlantic War of 1982. The campaigns 
were chosen because they involved elements of air, land, and sea power and 
demonstrated some of the tensions and complementary effects inherent in 
planning and employing joint forces. Finally, this study documents how the 
role of airpower evolved and changed in relative significance to other forces 
during the course of the campaigns.3 
The framework for analyzing airpower's role in the campaigns rests on the 
historical narrative revealing which of the forces was the central element in 
each of the major phases of the campaigns. With regard to airpower, either or 
both of two criteria must be met for airpower to be considered the central 
element of the phase. Specifically: 
1. Was airpower employed as the sole instrument of the campaign or phase 
of the campaign? 
2. Did air forces become predominant in campaign execution as the 
campaign evolved? 
Once the central element of each phase is determined, the analysis will 
investigate what conditions appeared to make airpower the critical element 
or, conversely, which placed airpower in a support role. The analysis is 
based on examining the following conditions during each phase of both 
campaigns: 
• What was the primary function of the phase? 
• What was the prevailing environment or climatic conditions that existed 
during operations? 
1. Daylight or darkness? 
2. Weather conditions? 
3. Visibility? 
• What topographic or geographic conditions prevailed during operations? 
• What concentration of forces or force composition prevailed during the 
phase? 
1. Were forces concentrated or dispersed? 
2. Did similar or dissimilar forces engage each other? 






Once these questions are answered they can be compared and contrasted 
for each phase of the campaign to determine similarities and differences of 
the central element and, in particular, conditions that shaped airpower's role. 
With the comparisons, some conclusions can be drawn concerning the role of 
airpower and its place within each campaign. From these conclusions, the 
planner may be able to decide more effectively when airpower should be the 
central element of the campaign or a phase thereof. 
Guadalcanal Campaign 
(7 August 1942-7 February 1943) 
Strategic and Operational Context 
The American conduct of the Pacific War was influenced to some extent by 
two basic concepts developed prior to American entry into World War II. The 
first concept asserted that the course of a Pacific War would be mostly decided 
by naval surface engagements. The second concept maintained that an 
invasion of Japan would be essential to achieving victory.4 The impact of the 
two concepts served to retard the development of airpower's overall 
capabilities because airpower was considered ancillary to surface forces and, 
therefore, an adjunct means to achieve surface objectives. The planning for 
the Guadalcanal Campaign occurred under the general influence of the two 
concepts as modified by subsequent combat experience with Japan at the 
apogee of its military expansion.5 
Following the naval victory at Midway, the United States gained a large 
measure of the initiative in the Pacific. However, before the Battle of Midway, 
the Japanese had already moved to extend their defensive perimeter by 
occupying Tulagi and Guadalcanal in the Eastern Solomon Islands.6 The 
Japanese believed they needed to develop Tulagi and Guadalcanal as a 
seaplane and airfield complex, respectively. Doing so would safeguard their 
main operating base at Rabaul by holding forward, fortified air bases to meet 
Allied attacks.7 
On 5 July 1942, Allied reconnaissance aircraft discovered the Japanese 
were building an airstrip on Guadalcanal's Lunga Point.8 What the Japanese 
planned as a forward base complex to defend Rabaul, the Allies viewed as an 
attempt to cut the sea lines of communication to Australia (fig. I).9 The Allies, 
who were already planning a three-phase offensive starting with Tulagi and 
the Santa Cruz Islands and ultimately leading to Rabaul, were now forced to 
reconsider their plans with a new sense of urgency.10 On the afternoon of 5 
July, Admirals Ernest J. Ring and Chester A. Nimitz deleted the Santa Cruz 
Islands from the initial phase of the plan and substituted Guadalcanal.11 
Planning and Landings 
Fortunately for the Allies, 1st Marine Division planners had intended to 
land a substantial number of troops on Guadalcanal, as they started 
deliberate planning to "seize Tulagi and adjacent positions" as part of the 
original Solomons campaign proposal.12 For Maj Gen Archer Vandegrift, 
commander 1st Marine Division, and Adm Robert L. Ghormley, commander, 
South Pacific Force and Area, the selection of objectives on Guadalcanal was 
relatively simple. They believed air superiority would be critical, so the 
principal objective would be the airfield at Lunga Point. Capturing the airfield 
would give the Americans control of the Southern Solomons and adjacent 
waters. The airfield also assumed great importance because Japanese aircraft 
were numerous in the Solomons and within range of Guadalcanal, while 
American land-based aircraft were few.13 
The aircraft support plan developed for Guadalcanal called for four basic 
actions. First, prior to D day, land-based bombers would perform counterair 
missions, attacking hostile airfield and antiaircraft installations in the 
Tulagi-Guadalcanal area.14 To support the landings, Gen George C. Kenney, 
commander of the South West Pacific Area Air Force, proposed counterair 
missions against the Japanese airfields near Rabaul and other Japanese 
airfields in the area.15 The second action called for fighters to maintain cover 
for the landings.16 Cover for the landings would come from the carriers USS 
Enterprise, USS Saratoga, and USS Wasp." However, Adm Frank J. Fletcher, 
the task force commander afloat (figs. 2 and 3), announced that the carriers 
could cover the landing for a maximum of 48 hours.18 Fletcher's 
announcement made the capture of the airfield even more important, putting 
great pressure on the surface ships given the task of protecting the transport 
ships supporting the landings from air, surface, and submarine attack. The 
third task called for carrier-based Marine aircraft to station themselves over 
Guadalcanal-Tulagi during daylight for close air support until they could 
operate from the airfield on Guadalcanal. After gaining air superiority over 
Guadalcanal and supporting the landings, airpower would be used to 
"neutraliz(e) . . . hostile forces on Guadalcanal-Tulagi" by performing 
interdiction.19 
Guadalcanal was the Marine Corps's first amphibious operation of the war, 
and it quickly became a logistics nightmare for the 1st Division.20 The Navy 
could not secure adequate sealift for all the troops and their equipment. As a 
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Figure 3. Organization of Landing Force for Task One 
uninterrupted resupply once the invasion began. When Adm Richmond Kelly 
Turner, the Amphibious Force commander, put to sea, the division's 
amphibious ships carried 60 days of general supplies and 10 days of 
ammunition. However, less than half of the vehicles, engineering, and aircraft 
equipment were placed in early shipments and would, therefore, have to be 
delivered after the landings.21 This made success of air operations even more 
important, especially in keeping the sea lines of communication open. 
At 0910, 7 August, one week before Japanese fighters were to begin using 
the airfield,22 Marines waded ashore on Beach Red, five miles east of Lunga 
Point.23 The landings achieved total surprise and went largely as planned, 
with the first two Marine battalions landing without firing a shot.24 
Although the Marines got ashore with considerable speed, the very success 
of the landings brought its own dangers and demonstrated the deficiencies of 
logistics planning. Without vehicles, equipment, manpower, and organization, 
the Marine ground party was overwhelmed and could not unload landing craft 
as quickly as the transports could send them ashore.25 Grounded landing craft 
and containers littered the beaches and surf. Nonetheless, the Marines were 
able to push inland, but the congestion made the landing very vulnerable to 
air attack. However, Japanese air units in the area were preparing to support 
the Japanese operations on Papua and, as at Midway, the Japanese lost 
precious time reconfiguring aircraft to attack the American transports at 
Guadalcanal.26 
General Vandegrift assumed Guadalcanal was manned by five thousand 
Japanese, including a regiment of twenty-one hundred infantry.27 However, 
the main combat force was on Tulagi and Guadalcanal was manned by only 
twenty-five hundred construction troops, with a guard unit of 150 men facing 
a landing force of ten thousand Marines.28 As a result of the overwhelming 
American strength on the island, the Marines were able to capture the airfield 
the following day, 8 August.29 
Early Operations of the Japanese Defense 
Even with his success, General Vandegrift feared a rapid counter stroke. He 
was particularly concerned the Japanese might bring their superior numbers 
in the area to Guadalcanal and attempt a forced lodgment against the Marine 
beach defenses with armored landing craft, naval gunfire, and aircraft, 
thereby destroying Marine forces on the island.30 The Japanese did react 
quickly, but it may have worked to the advantage of the Americans. 
The Japanese had underestimated the size of the American landing force, 
believing it to be only the tentative beginning of a larger operation.31 As a 
result, the Japanese did not pause to prepare an adequate counterlanding, 
and their efforts to retake Guadalcanal were piecemeal. For example, the first 
units sent to Guadalcanal set sail at 2200 hours on 7 August, the night of the 
landings. However, they were recalled to Rabaul the following day after 
learning the airfield had been captured by the Marines.32 Although the speed 
of the Japanese response may have hurt their efforts to effect a forced 
lodgment on the island, their efforts at sea and in the air had an early 
influence on the campaign. 
As soon as Adm Isoroku Yamamoto learned of the American landings, he 
ordered Adm Gunichl Mikawa, commander of Eighth Fleet, Outer South Seas 
Force, to attack the ships at Guadalcanal with every available land-based 
bomber.33 At Rabaul, the 25th Air Flotilla with 32 Betty bombers and other 
attack aircraft, escorted by 18 long-range Zeroes, took off at 0930 for 
Guadalcanal. The Japanese aircraft approached their targets in early 
afternoon and were engaged by Wildcats from Enterprise, Saratoga, and 
Wasp. In the air battle that followed, the Zero proved superior to the Wildcat, 
downing one-half of those participating. However, clouds obscured the 
American transports when the Betty's arrived and their bombs were released 
into the sea with no damage to the landing force.34 Nine Japanese 
dive-bombers arrived at midafternoon, hit one destroyer and set fire to one 
transport, both eventually sank.35 However, after the initial air battle, the 
Japanese had not achieved their objective of disrupting the American landing. 
Nonetheless, the air raids continued the following day with great effect. Most 
significantly, Admiral Fletcher, who had promised two days of carrier support 
for the landings, was compelled to withdraw his carrier force on the evening of 
8 August. Fletcher, who had lost the USS Lexington at Coral Sea and the USS 
Yorktown at Midway, was concerned about Japanese air attacks and was 
determined not to lose a carrier at Guadalcanal.36 By 9 August the Japanese 
were flying over Guadalcanal unopposed by American aircraft.37 
The Battle of Savo Island 
In the meantime, Admiral Mikawa organized his warships for an 
engagement against the American transports and sailed with a force of seven 
surface combatants on 8 August.38 The ships passed undetected south of Savo 
Island into the sound between Guadalcanal and Tulagi.39 Although the 
Japanese fleet was spotted steaming southeast toward Guadalcanal, the 
reports were delayed eight hours because the search pilot did not break radio 
silence to report the sighting while airborne. Furthermore, the ships were 
misidentified and were reported to have seaplane tenders in the force. The 
information led Admiral Turner to believe the Japanese would strike by air 
attack and, therefore, would not make a night attack.40 The Japanese attack 
was, in fact, made at night, with naval artillery and torpedoes—a form of 
naval warfare at which the Japanese were well trained and experienced.41 In 
30 minutes four Allied ships were sunk and three others damaged.42 The 
Japanese force escaped almost unscathed, the only loss coming at the hands of 
the American submarine S-44 on the morning of 10 August as Mikawa's force 
returned to Rabaul.43 The Battle of Savo Island was the first large surface 
action since the Spanish-American War fought by a predominantly American 
force. The battle was not decisive, but it initiated a series of naval surface 
engagements that would characterize much of naval warfare in the area for 
the next year. Although the battle of surface forces resulted in the loss of four 
surface combatants, the Navy achieved its objective. The Japanese did not 
reach the American transports.44 
Force Buildup and Expansion of the American Perimeter 
What followed for the next two weeks was an attempt by both sides to build 
up their forces on the island. Thus far, the Japanese had resisted the 
American landings with the air and naval resources on hand, with the action 
based on the initiative of the local commanders.45 The Japanese believed the 
island had to be reinforced and held. To accomplish their reinforcement, the 
Japanese would have to control the air and sea around Guadalcanal. On the 
other hand, General Vandegrift knew he must prepare a fortified perimeter 
and provide reinforcement and adequate supply to his command if he were to 
eliminate Japanese army units from Guadalcanal. Both sides understood the 
airfield, now named Henderson Field, would give the Americans the 
permanent airpower to resist Japanese reinforcement and counter both 
Japanese naval and air bombardment. On 20 August the first two of 15 
Marine fighter and fighter-bomber squadrons landed on Henderson Field.46 
During the buildup the Japanese sent scattered reinforcements and 
supplies to their forces on Guadalcanal. However, most of the Japanese 
reinforcement came at night by fast destroyers, which were unsuited for the 
task. During the day, the Americans controlled the air, and thus the sea, 
around Guadalcanal. However, at night, when darkness hampered flight 
operations, the Americans would cease flying and the Japanese would regain 
control of the sea, which allowed the "Tokyo Express" to resupply their units 
ashore.47 During this period the Japanese were able to land a one thousand 
man unit on the island, but that was still inadequate in the face of 15,000 
Marines. The Japanese unit was destroyed during the night battle at Tenaru 
River, 20-21 August.48 
This period also marked the beginning of a series of long-range air battles 
over Guadalcanal with Marine, Navy, Army Air Force, and New Zealand air 
force units participating in actions against the Japanese. The air campaign 
raged for six months with both carrier-based fighters and fighter-bombers, 
augmented by land-based bombers to protect Marine positions from air attack 
and destroy Japanese shipping inbound to Guadalcanal.49 Henderson Field 
became an unsinkable aircraft carrier, critical to the campaign, and it could 
only be captured by reinforcing Japanese units on the island.50 A great battle 
with significant reinforcement was imminent if the Japanese were to capture 
Henderson Field and retake Guadalcanal. 
The Battle of the Eastern Solomons, 22-25 August 
Having decided that Guadalcanal must be retaken, the Japanese army 
command on Rabaul planned a reinforcement with fifteen hundred additional 
men, still apparently unaware that 15,000 Marines were on Guadalcanal.51 
However, the Japanese had lost their best opportunity to reinforce their small 
garrison on Guadalcanal by failing to exploit their victory at the Battle of 
Savo Island.52 The Japanese Combined Fleet sortied on 23 August to destroy 
the American Southwest Fleet, recapture Guadalcanal, and protect their 
convoy of men and equipment committed to the landings.53 
Admiral Yamamoto assembled two task forces totaling 58 ships, including 
six carriers with a total of 177 planes.54 Reconnaissance aircraft and 
Australian coast watchers alerted the Navy to Japanese preparations.55 
Admiral Fletcher had three carriers with a total of 259 planes. However, 
American strength was reduced by one-third when a faulty intelligence 
assessment persuaded Admiral Fletcher that it was safe for Wasp to sail 
south and refuel, thus equalizing the strength of the two air arms.56 
Yamamoto believed his forces must accomplish two tasks for the Japanese 
landings to succeed. First, Yamamoto needed to destroy the American fleet; 
and second, he needed to protect the Japanese convoy en route to 
Guadalcanal. Yamamoto understood the Japanese situation on Guadalcanal 
was critical and the reinforcements that were desperately needed could not be 
delivered as long as the American fleet existed around the island. 
Furthermore, the fleet supplied both Henderson Field and Marine ground 
forces, and therefore had to be destroyed. To accomplish the first task 
Yamamoto planned to sink the American carriers, destroy the remaining 
defenseless surface ships, and then put Henderson Field out of action with 
Japanese carrier-based aircraft.57 
Yamamoto intended to accomplish his second task by subjecting Henderson 
Field and the Marine ground units to an intense night bombardment from his 
heavy cruisers while the convoy slipped into Guadalcanal under cover of 
darkness. To help accomplish both tasks, Yamamoto stationed the small 
carrier Ryujo one hundred miles from Adm Chuichi Nagumo's main-carrier 
force and dedicated it to attacking Henderson Field.58 Yamamoto believed that 
stationing the carrier away from the main force with its own escorts might 
conceal its location and make the attacks on the airfield more successful if the 
main body was engaged by American airpower.59 
Midmorning, 24 August, air reconnaissance made contact with the 
Japanese carrier Ryujo and Admiral Fletcher ordered units of Enterprise to 
locate and attack the carrier. Over 20 aircraft armed with bombs took off at 
1230 to engage Ryujo. An hour later Fletcher launched an additional 30 
bombers and eight torpedo planes from Saratoga to join those already 
airborne.60 In the meantime, Ryujo launched 21 aircraft joined by bombers 
from Rabaul for an attack on Henderson Field.61 They were detected by 
Enterprise's radar and engaged by units on the island. The airfield suffered 
only minor damage, but the Japanese lost more than 20 aircraft to American 
fighters. As the air battle over Guadalcanal raged, aircraft from Saratoga 
found Ryujo turning into the wind to launch her remaining combat air patrol 
aircraft against Saratoga's aircraft. Ryujo would not be afloat to recover her 
aircraft. It took hits from four to 10 one thousand-pound bombs and one 
torpedo before it sank.62 
Next came the Japanese counter strike. Anticipating it, Fletcher retained 
over 50 fighters aboard Enterprise to meet any attackers when he launched 
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the American attack on the Japanese task forces.63 At 1638 Japanese dive 
bombers with fighter escorts attacked Enterprise. Enterprise took three bombs 
and was burning, but there was no damage to her hull.64 As Enterprise burned 
her complement of aircraft recovered on Guadalcanal, further bolstering the 
island's defenses.65 Ironically, by putting .Enterprise temporarily out of the 
fight and accomplishing part of his first objective, Yamamoto made 
accomplishment of his second objective much more difficult. 
Nevertheless, the Japanese instrument to retake the island, a convoy with 
fifteen hundred troops, was still steaming for Guadalcanal.66 It was a long 
night for the combatants with the Japanese launching both aerial and naval 
bombardments against the island, and Guadalcanal's air units retaliating.67 
On the morning of 25 August, Marine dive bombers looking for the Japanese 
carriers, instead, found the transports 125 miles from Guadalcanal.68 Aided by 
eight B-17s from Espiritu Santo, the aircraft sank a transport and destroyer.69 
What remained of the convoy had to retire.70 
The Battle of the Eastern Solomons prevented the Japanese convoy from 
landing on Guadalcanal. It was also the third battle of the war where the 
surface units never made contact and the outcome was decided by air action 
only. It was, however, unique in that it was the first time a Japanese assault 
force and convoy had been turned back solely by air action.71 
The Battles of September and October 
Due to the Tokyo Express nighttime reinforcement, the Japanese managed 
to get sixty-five hundred troops on the island by mid-September. These troops 
attacked Lunga Ridge, near Henderson Field and a key to the defensive 
perimeter. However, they were repulsed by the Marines who exchanged two 
hundred men for two thousand Japanese in the fighting.72 
Over the next month, a series of reinforcements was made by both sides. 
American strength on Guadalcanal was brought to over 23,000 men, while the 
Japanese strength was about 13,000.73 A series of battles, centered around the 
airfield, took place with the largest battle beginning 22 October as a double 
envelopment of Henderson Field. The Japanese offensive was one of the most 
vicious of the Guadalcanal campaign, but the Marines held and the Japanese 
retired on the morning of 26 October.74 
While the Japanese attack on Henderson Field was being repulsed, Adm 
William F. "Bull" Halsey, now in command of the South Pacific Area, decided 
to take the battle to the enemy.75 Yamamoto also sought decisive battle with 
the American fleet, particularly given the continuing failure of the Japanese 
army to recapture Guadalcanal. Yamamoto sent his forces south on 25 
October divided in two task forces.76 Early on 26 October the forces made 
contact, with both forces sighting each other at approximately the same time. 
Each fleet launched air attacks simultaneously, while maintaining a reserve 
for combat air patrol in the event of enemy attack.77 As the battle progressed, 
the Americans hit and damaged the carriers Zuiho and Shokaku. In the 
meantime, the Hornet was found in the open and attacked by dive bombers. 
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Later the Enterprise was also damaged by dive bombers. By midafternoon 26 
October the Hornet was still under attack, taking a mortal blow from the 
Japanese bombers. The Hornet was abandoned while the crippled Zuiho and 
Shokaku steamed north to safety.78 
As both sides retired, the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands was over. 
Enterprise's losses were not heavy; and although the Hornet was lost, her 
aircraft were not, having recovered on the Enterprise. The American carriers 
had taken a beating. The Japanese had won a victory, but a Pyrrhic one, 
losing over one hundred aircraft, although none of their ships were sunk.79 
Once again the surface units never made contact and the decision came from 
air units alone. For the time being, the situation at sea was stalemated by the 
Japanese failure to isolate Guadalcanal, thereby giving the Americans time to 
reinforce and prepare for the next battle.80 The battle was a turning point 
because the Japanese subsequently stopped their continuous air attacks on 
Henderson Field and Marine positions on Guadalcanal. When they did attack, 
the Japanese often jettisoned their bombs at the sight of American fighters 
rather than proceeding toward their targets.81 
As October closed the Americans were able to take the offensive on 
Guadalcanal because American strength had grown to the equivalent of two 
divisions and the threat of Japanese air attack was greatly reduced.82 As the 
Marines began to meet success on the ground the Japanese finally decided to 
attack Guadalcanal with a sizable force. They prepared a reinforcement 
contingent of 13,000 men in 11 transports protected by 11 destroyers and four 
large surface combatants to prepare the landing site and shell Henderson 
Field.83 
The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, 12-15 November 
Phase one of the battle began as Admiral Turner's Task Force was 
unloading troops and equipment on Guadalcanal. Learning of the approach of 
Japanese Betty bombers and dive bombers, Turner quit unloading. As Turner 
sailed he was immediately engaged by the aircraft. In the action that 
followed, a destroyer and cruiser were damaged. Adm Daniel J. Callaghan, 
commander of the surface support task group, escorted the transports safely 
away and reversed course toward the oncoming Japanese task force 
designated to shell the island installations. Late night 12 November Admiral 
Callaghan's force made radar contact on the Japanese bombardment force.84 
As the forces closed to near point-blank range the Japanese sighted the 
American task group and opened fire.85 In the fighting that followed, losses 
were heavy on both sides, with the Americans losing two admirals, one of 
them Callaghan. Tactically a draw, the first phase of the battle was 
strategically an American success. The planned bombardment of Henderson 
Field was repulsed and the convoy of 13,000 troops was turned back.86 
Phase two began during the daylight of 13 November with intensive air 
activity on both sides. Yamamoto remained determined to land the 
reinforcements on Guadalcanal. As the Japanese Task Force regrouped, he 
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ordered the convoy to start south again. By noon the Japanese Task Force 
was reunited and within minutes was attacked by dive bombers from 
Guadalcanal. The dive bombers were joined by B-17s and the mixed force 
damaged one transport and sank two others. These losses, added with losses 
from earlier action, left the Japanese with only four fully capable transports 
and four others damaged.87 
In the meantime, the American Task Force—centered around 
Enterprise—still remained south of Guadalcanal looking for the Japanese 
carriers. With good air reconnaissance and the subsequent dive bomber 
attack, Admiral Halsey was fairly certain as to the size, location, and 
objectives of the Japanese landing forces. With this information Halsey 
decided to protect his only carrier, and station Enterprise south of 
Guadalcanal. It would be up to the surface combatants to prevent a 
bombardment of Henderson Field. However, the order came too late, and no 
surface combatant could reach the area before daybreak on 14 November, 
which left nothing at sea between Henderson Field and the Japanese.88 As a 
result, Henderson Field suffered a deluge of fire from the Japanese ships. 
However, miraculously, when the losses were counted the following morning, 
only a few planes had been lost and the field remained operational.89 In the 
meantime, the remaining Japanese transports with troops, escorted by a large 
combatant force, were steaming south toward Guadalcanal.90 
As morning broke phase three of the battle began with reports revealing 
the location and size of the approaching Japanese force. Aircraft from 
Henderson Field and later Enterprise attacked the force, concentrating on the 
surface escorts. In the initial attacks, the Japanese lost one heavy cruiser and 
suffered damage to four others. The next wave of attackers, consisting solely 
of land-based dive bombers, torpedo bombers, and B-17s concentrated on the 
transports. Later Enterprise launched its second strike of bombers against the 
transports. These planes recovered at Henderson Field, reconfigured, and 
launched to fly another strike against the transports before returning to 
Enterprise, thus increasing their combat sortie rate. At a cost of only five 
aircraft, the Americans sank seven Japanese transports and many of the 
13,000 troops with airpower alone. However, there were still four damaged 
transports and 11 surface combatants approaching Guadalcanal.91 
Many lessons were learned that day concerning airpower. First, both sides 
learned what happens to lightly protected ships sailing under 
enemy-controlled airspace. The destroyer screen with fighter cover was 
ineffective in defending the landing force. Second, more antiaircraft defenses 
were needed to protect the fleet. Third, the Japanese realized they needed 
another airfield in the area to protect their ships running the "slot." Finally, 
the Americans witnessed how the effectiveness of carrier-based aircraft could 
be increased when given the option of using an unsinkable "land carrier" 
during combat operations.92 
The battle ended with a surface engagement over the night of 14-15 
November against the remaining ships of the Tokyo Express trying to land at 
Guadalcanal. In the action a Japanese battleship and destroyer were lost at 
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the cost of three American destroyers sunk and the battleship USS South 
Dakota damaged. For a time the battle raged between 14 Japanese 
combatants and the lone United States Navy battleship, Washington.93 
In the end the Japanese had to withdraw. However, they managed to land 
two thousand men under the extreme combat conditions of the previous three 
days. The Japanese soldiers were without supplies. During the battle the 
Japanese lost all of their supplies except 260 rounds of artillery ammunition 
and a four-day supply of rice for the troops ashore.94 The net result of the 
battle was to give the Americans control of the air and sea around 
Guadalcanal and assure final victory in the campaign.95 
Securing Guadalcanal and Japanese Withdrawal 
On 18 November General Vandegrift began offensive operations along the 
western coast with other units pushing eastward to eliminate the Japanese 
from the island.96 As the attacks progressed, the Marines on Guadalcanal 
received the good news that they would be relieved by the American division 
of the United States Army, commanded by Maj Gen Alexander M. Patch. 
General Patch assumed command on 9 December.97 
It would take two more months of bitter fighting for General Patch to 
secure the island and physically drag the Japanese from their concealed 
positions. The final blow came to the Japanese in the last week of January 
and first week of February when the Japanese finally withdrew from 
Guadalcanal on 6 February 1943.98 Prior to the war the Army knew that 
Japanese defensive doctrine was based on establishing forward positions 
which were to be held "to the last extremity."99 So it proved on Guadalcanal. 
After a tenacious defense the Japanese realized they could not take 
Guadalcanal and began withdrawing the remaining 13,000 troops on 1 
February 1943. Due to a skillful deception, the Japanese completed the 
evacuation on 7 February without being detected by the Americans.100 
Analysis—Guadalcanal 
Determining the Central Elements 
Planning and Landings. Clearly the Guadalcanal Campaign was 
planned as an amphibious operation. Although the objective of the landing 
was to capture the Japanese airfield on the island, the instrument planned to 
gain access to the airfield was the landing force. As a result the landing force 
was the central element during planning and the landing phases of the 
campaign (table 1). An amphibious operation requires naval transport to 
arrive at the objective area, but it is clear that the transport supports the 
landing force. Finally, the air support plan made it very clear that airpower 
was considered a support element for the landings. 
Early Operations. After the initial success of the landings, the Japanese 
launched aircraft against the landing force to disrupt the landings. Although 
14 
Table 1 
Determining the Central Element— Guadalcanal 
»^Phases                        Elements-* Air Land Sea 
Planning and Landings • 
Early Operations • 
Savo Island • 
Force Buildup • 
Eastern Solomons • 
September/October Battles • 
Naval Guadalcanal • 
Consolidation and Withdrawal • 
the Japanese failed to achieve their primary objective, the presence of 
Japanese airpower forced Admiral Fletcher to consider the risks of exposing 
his carriers to Japanese air attack and compelled him to withdraw his 
carriers beyond Japanese aircraft range. Fletcher's decision did two things. 
First, it left both the Marines and the transports vulnerable to air attack. 
Second, it placed Guadalcanal at or beyond the range of the fighter and attack 
aircraft tasked to support the landings. Concerns over Japanese air attack 
and the resulting decision to withdraw the carriers elevated airpower to the 
central element of the phase, although Japanese airpower failed to have a 
decisive impact on the landings. 
The Battle of Savo Island. Although the battle resulted in the loss of four 
American surface combatants and proved to be indecisive, the surface fleet 
prevented the Japanese from engaging the American transports supporting 
the early landings on Guadalcanal. As a result the sea arm was the central 
element because the Japanese fleet was beyond the reach of land forces; and 
airpower had been withdrawn earlier on the carriers. Although the battle 
area may have allowed land-based bombers to enter the fight, darkness 
precluded both accurate target identification and accurate weapons delivery. 
Force Buildup. During this period the airfield was completed and named 
Henderson Field. Although important, it was overshadowed by the Marines 
who held the airfield, completed it and expanded the perimeter around it to 
keep it safe from Japanese attack from within the island. The airfield allowed 
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the Americans to assume control of the air and sea around Guadalcanal 
during the day. Likewise, naval transport was important in allowing the force 
buildup to occur. However, the failure of both air and sea power to stop the 
Tokyo Express from reinforcing the island relegates both to support status 
behind the land component, which was the central element of this phase. 
Battle of Eastern Solomons. Clearly airpower was the central element of 
this phase. The battle was beyond the reach of land forces. It was also the 
third battle of the Pacific War in which naval surface forces never made 
contact. Additionally, the battle marked the first instance that a Japanese 
assault force and convoy were turned from an objective by air-action alone. 
Battles of September and October. During this period the Marines 
successfully defended Henderson Field from Japanese counterattacks and 
extended the perimeter around the field. The defensive action on the island 
was vital to keeping the airfield operational. However, the efforts of the 
Marines were overshadowed by the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. During 
the battle Hornet was lost and Enterprise was damaged. However, Hornet's 
aircraft recovered on Enterprise, which remained seaworthy. The Japanese 
lost no ships, but lost over 100 aircraft. In addition, two Japanese carriers 
were damaged and withdrawn from the fight. Once again, surface units never 
made contact. The importance of the battle was twofold. First, the Japanese 
were unable to isolate Guadalcanal; and second, Japanese air strength was 
depleted to the point they could not continue daily air attacks on 
Guadalcanal. Furthermore, removal of Japanese carriers placed Japanese 
fighter and attack aircraft at the extreme limits of their operational range 
when attacking Guadalcanal, while the Americans were literally fighting over 
their own airdrome. 
Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. The Naval Battle of Guadalcanal began 
with a Japanese air attack on American transports unloading troops and 
supplies at the Guadalcanal anchorage. Admiral Turner was compelled to 
stop unloading and leave the island to avoid air attack. In a night engagement 
that followed the Japanese air attack the United States Navy lost two 
admirals while preventing Japanese landing forces from reaching 
Guadalcanal. Although the surface engagement prevented a Japanese landing 
early in the battle, it was not the central element of the campaign because 
most of the destruction and damage to the Japanese fleet came at the hands 
of airpower in subsequent air attacks. The battle concluded with a night 
surface engagement against the few remaining Japanese transport and 
escorts. However, airpower had controlled the air and sea around 
Guadalcanal, destroying virtually all equipment and supplies of the landing 
force, that came ashore with little more than two thousand men of the 
planned 13,000 man force. 
Consolidation and Withdrawal. Although both airpower and sea power 
contributed to the successful conclusion of the campaign, the final offensives 
under General Vandegrift and, later, General Patch were central to the final 
phase of the campaign. Airpower provided both close air support and 
interdiction of sea lines of communication, while sea power increased its 
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control of the sea. However, the Japanese had to be expelled from the island 
and land forces were central to the effort. 
Analyzing Conditions When Sea and Land Power Were Central 
The purpose of this analysis is to determine what conditions existed to 
place a particular element in either a central or supporting role (table 2). Five 
conditions were identified for expanded analysis: 
1. The function performed by the central element. 
2. The prevailing environment or climatic conditions. 
3. The topographic or geographic conditions impacting the central element. 
4. The force composition or concentration of the central element and 
adversary. 
5. The capabilities the central element brought to the battle. 
The central elements of each phase were identified in table 1. Of the phases 
presented, sea power was determined to be central in one phase while land 
forces were central in three. 
Sea. Since only one phase of the campaign, the Battle of Savo Island, was 
discovered in which sea power was the critical element, no trend exists. 
However, with only one exception, the conditions present when sea power was 
central were uniquely different from conditions present when either land or 
air were central. For example, sea power was central in the only battle fought 
exclusively at night. Additionally, sea power was central in the only 
engagement where only similar forces engaged each other. Furthermore, sea 
power was central in the only phase exclusively involved with sea control. 
Most surprising were the findings in the area of capabilities. One often 
thinks of ships as possessing inherent maneuverability. However, in this case 
there was far more mass than maneuver, as the ships sailed predictable 
tracks very close to each other during the heaviest of the fighting. To some 
degree, the nature of the archipelagic formation restricted both operational 
and tactical maneuver. Additionally, sea forces are considered to possess 
persistence because of their ability to maintain presence in an area for 
extended periods of time. However, the Battle of Savo Island was the shortest 
engagement of the shortest phase surveyed. The fighting lasted no more than 
30 minutes; and the time between the first shot fired and the last ship sunk 
was little more than an hour.101 
Again, with only one phase to examine, there can be no trend analysis. The 
conditions that existed during the only phase in which sea power was central 
were different from other phases. Specifically, the function, environment, and 
capabilities demonstrated during the only sea control phase were found in 
that phase only. Nonetheless, although sea forces lost four cruisers during the 
short phase, the Japanese did not disrupt the landings and retired. 
Land. Land forces were identified as the central element in three of the 
eight phases surveyed. With regard to the conditions that existed when land 
power was central, the highest degree of correlation between phases was 
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operations were conducted in accomplishing the missions assigned to land 
forces. However, let us first review the variable conditions of environment, 
topography, and forces as they applied to land forces in this campaign. 
The environment in which land forces were central was highly variable. 
The only exclusively daylight operation was the initial landing on 
Guadalcanal. Thereafter, land forces fought day and night, and in highly 
variable climatic conditions. This in part may be explained due to temporal 
factors. Land forces tended to fight longer engagements during longer phases 
than either air or sea forces. 
Surprisingly, the topography associated with the phases in which land 
power was central was highly variable. The landings were obviously on the 
beaches, which characterize an archipelagic formation. However, the force 
buildup and perimeter expansion occurred in the interior of the island, which 
was a mountainous tropical jungle. The final phase, during which the 
Japanese withdrew, was fought on a fairly narrow coastal plain with the 
ocean on the northeastern flank and mountainous jungle to the southwest. 
The force composition during land-central phases always involved elements 
of other forces. This was particularly true of the landings and the final phase, 
during which the Japanese withdrew. The closest land forces came to fighting 
a pure land versus land phase was during force buildup. During the phase the 
US Marines were subject to air attack, particularly during the time after the 
carriers left and Henderson Field was completed. However, the airfield was 
completed during the end of the phase giving the Marines much needed air 
cover and close air support to consolidate the perimeter around the only 
friendly airfield in the Solomons. Completion of the airfield accentuated the 
American ability to protect friendly lines of communication, and ultimately 
win the battle of the buildup on Guadalcanal. Nonetheless, land power first 
captured the airfield, built it, expanded the perimeter around it, and 
protected it, while bearing the burden of battle during the period. 
The condition made up of the functional mission elements of each phase 
showed a definite correlation, not in mission type, but in the manner that 
land missions were conducted. Not surprisingly, in every case where land 
power was central, the dominant feature characterizing land missions was 
close operations, although missions varied in type from offensive to defensive. 
Once again this may be explained by the generally longer land phases, during 
which the relationship between offense and defense is in a continual state of 
flux due to the dynamic nature of combat.102 
There appears to be a high degree of correlation between the land central 
phases with regard to capabilities. In all three phases that land power was 
central, mass and persistence dominated other capabilities. The only notable 
exception was with the planning and landing phase during which maneuver 
was also present. The exception may be explained with regard to the 
amphibious operation and the unique characteristics of amphibious forces as 
sea power transitions to land power. 
One must understand that correlation does not equate to causation. The 
absence of obvious maneuver and deep operations does not necessarily mean 
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land power possesses no capability of maneuver or no ability to conduct deep 
operations. The reason there appears to be an absence of maneuver may be 
related more to the variable topography (beach, mountainous jungle, and 
coastal plain), environment (day, night, and weather), and the relatively 
small size of the island, than to an inherent lack of capability with regard to 
land forces during this campaign. All of these factors would reasonably seem 
to restrict operations to some extent. Nonetheless, during the Guadalcanal 
campaign, the dominant capabilities of land forces were mass and persistence 
while operations were characterized by close operations. 
Airpower as the Central Element 
Airpower proved to be unique with regard to this analysis of the 
Guadalcanal Campaign. There appears to be a stronger correlation among the 
conditions present during each phase when airpower was the central element 
than was the case with land power. For example, during the four phases when 
airpower was central, the functions performed were always counterair and 
tactical air support to maritime operations (TASMO); and all but one phase 
involved interdiction of sea lines of communication. All air-central phases 
were fought predominantly during daylight when visibility was good. The 
forces participating invariably were air and sea with both air versus air and 
air versus sea engagements. Finally, airpower was central when there was a 
need to bring speed, range, mass, and maneuver to the campaign. 
The only condition which seemed to have no correlation between phases 
was topography. The air-central phases were fought equally over open ocean 
and areas of land-water contrast. The reason airpower was central over such 
areas may have several reasons. First, the speed and range of aircraft allowed 
them to leave ships and land bases to meet Japanese aircraft approaching the 
fleet or Guadalcanal. Second, target acquisition is easier in an area where 
cover is not readily available and large targets abound. Although ships can 
disperse, such dispersal is uniquely different from cover and concealment 
available to land forces in a tropical, mountainous jungle. Both the preceding 
reasons give rise to a third. Invariably, aircraft engaged air weapons, whether 
in the air, at sea, or on land. Furthermore, the impact of airpower could be 
felt to a greater degree by air and sea forces than by the relatively small 
number of dispersed land forces. Therefore, the relatively higher 
concentration of air and sea forces may have worked with the preceding 
factors to make air versus air and air versus sea engagements the dominant 
characteristic of air-central phases, which by implication excludes both land 
topography and land forces. 
The preceding paragraph explains to some extent why the missions of 
air-central phases involved counterair and TASMO in every instance. In two 
phases surface forces never made contact. In one case the counterair aspect 
was negative, with Admiral Fletcher ordering his carriers to depart 
Guadalcanal during the early operations, in part, to take them beyond the 
reach of Japanese land-based aviation. Therefore, the threat of Japanese air 
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attack had an early impact on the Americans' capability to employ airpower 
during the campaign. 
Quite often the object of air attacks was the carrier force (counterair). 
However, to penetrate enemy defenses often required engaging both fighters 
(counterair) and escorts (TASMO) protecting the carrier. Even when the 
object of the mission was attacking logistics ships (interdiction), the general 
principle applied. Therefore, an attack on any naval force (air or sea) required 
both counterair and TASMO mission elements to have reasonable chance of 
success. 
The characteristic environment of air-central phases was daylight and good 
visibility. This is not surprising, especially when accounting for the 
technology of 1942. However, such factors still influence air operations today. 
Only a minority of modern aircraft have an accurate all-weather delivery 
capability for conventional weapons. Likewise, few aircraft have a true 
all-weather, beyond visual range capability for air-to-air combat.103 
Most striking were the capabilities airpower brought to the campaign. 
Although it is no surprise that airpower brought speed and range to the 
campaign (both speed and range are generally accepted characteristics of 
airpower); what is striking is that airpower brought a combination of both 
mass and maneuver to the campaign that can best be explained as the 
capability to bring mass with maneuver to the campaign. In all air-central 
phases large numbers of aircraft participated, with, at times, hundreds of 
aircraft airborne simultaneously. Additionally, the forward presence 
Henderson Field provided gave the Americans the ability to reach the 
Japanese and strike from almost any direction. Although the ability to employ 
mass with maneuver was important to air forces, the absence of persistence 
among airpower's capabilities during the campaign is evident at a glance (see 
table 2) and important if one is to understand the nature of airpower. 
Airpower's lack of persistence was a limitation during the campaign and is 
still a limitation today. It would seem the only way to compensate (and maybe 
only partially) for this lack of persistence is through greater accuracy and 
weapons effects. 
Airpower Summary—Guadalcanal 
The air support plan for Guadalcanal began by calling for airpower to play 
a support role. After a brief counterair phase, the planners believed airpower 
would support the landing force with both close air support and interdiction 
missions. However, they did not foresee engagements such as the Battles of 
the Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz Islands, when Japanese convoys were 
brought under air attack by carrier- and land-based air and turned back by 
air-action alone. They did not foresee the impact land-based air would have on 
carrier operations intended to support surface engagements. The defeat of the 
Japanese Naval Air Force during the campaign ensured Japanese resistance 
could not be sustained on land, sea, or in the air and was more devastating to 
Japanese naval aviation than the Battle of Midway.104 Control of the air was 
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essential to the success of every major military operation during the 
campaign. General Vandegrift acknowledged the role of airpower in the 
campaign noting, surface forces "cannot project anything forward unless 
adequately covered by air."105 Airpower controlled its own element during the 
campaign. Japanese surface forces were unable to cope with American 
airpower that established local air superiority in all areas of operations, 
destroying Japanese fighting power on the surface and in the air. In large 
part airpower was able to do this because of its unique ability to bring mass 
with maneuver to the campaign. 
South Atlantic War 
(2 April-14 June 1982) 
Background, Strategic, and Operational Context 
Over 40 years ago, the government of Prime Minister Clement Atlee began 
the program of decolonization which followed the Second World War. Today 
only a few scattered colonies remain in the British Empire. They are normally 
characterized by one of two features: (1) the lack of a self-sufficient economy; 
or (2) the threat of annexation by a more powerful neighbor.106 The Falkland 
Islands are characterized by both, and the Argentinian claim to sovereignty 
over the islands proved to be the more important in the spring of 1982.107 
The Argentinians had never actually occupied the islands. Discovery of the 
islands is usually attributed to the Elizabethan navigator, Capt John Davis, 
who sighted and charted them in 1592. The first documented landing was 
made in 1690 when the English ship Welfare, commanded by John Strong, 
sent a party ashore. Captain Strong named the islands Falkland after the 
then First Lord of the Admiralty. The first settlement was French, founded by 
Antoine-Louis de Bougainville in 1764. However, in 1767 the French 
settlement was formally transferred to Spain. As this occurred, the British 
claimed the islands in 1765 and established a base on them the following 
year. Superior strength allowed the British to prevail by 1770, but the 
Spaniards never renounced their claim to the islands. It is from the Spanish 
claim that the current Argentinian claim arises, because they regard 
themselves as Spain's inheritors in the South Atlantic.108 
In 1829 the first Argentinian settlers arrived at the Falklands and found 
British settlers there. Clashes between settlers led to British administration 
over the islands when Britain annexed them in 1833 and expelled the 
Argentinian settlers. Although Argentina did not attempt to establish 
anymore settlements on the islands, it never relinquished its claim.109 
More recently, in 1970 Argentina and Britain agreed to settle the dispute 
by negotiation. A series of agreements was reached over the next decade 
concerning the relations between the islands and Argentina. However, in 1981 
talks began to stall after Argentina rejected a British proposal to "freeze" the 
dispute for an agreed period of time during which both sides could cooperate 
to develop the islands' resources.110 After a period of tensions the Argentinian 
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military junta decided, during March 1982, to invade and "recover" the 
Falklands on 2 April.111 The operation, code-named Operation Azul, was "to 
land on the Malvinas Islands, to dislodge the British forces and authorities 
stationed there."112 
On 2 April the Security Council of the United Nations condemned the 
Argentinian invasion in Security Council Resolution 502.113 Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher announced the intention of her government "to see that 
the islands are freed from occupation and are returned to British 
administration at the earliest possible moment."114 British public opinion 
demanded military action in recovering the islands, despite the fact that the 
British forces developed predominantly for defensive purposes in Europe 
would have to conduct offensive operations seven thousand nautical miles 
(NM) from home.115 The Argentinians would have to maintain control of the 
islands with a force neither prepared or expecting a war with Britain.116 
Operation Azul 
Once the military junta decided to reclaim the islands by force, Argentine 
crisis-action planning began. The Argentinians established an amphibious landing 
force, commanded by Rear Adm Gualter O. Allara with the following units: 
• The landing force—2d Marine Battalion, an amphibious commando unit, 
an army rifle company, and reserves. 
• The transport group—troop carrier Cabo San Antonio, icebreaker 
Almirante Irizar, and transport Isla de Jos Estados. 
• A support, escort and landing group—destroyers Hercules and Santisima 
Trinidad; and the corvettes Drumond and Granville. 
• A special task force group—the submarine Santa Fe.117 
The task force objectives were to occupy Stanley, capture the airfield at 
Stanley, and control the islands' inhabitants in order to establish a 
provisional government. Additionally, for political reasons, the junta wanted 
the objectives accomplished without British loss of life. On the night of 1 
April, all ships were at their assigned positions and the air force attack 
squadrons were ready if needed for the invasion. Other than 40 Royal 
Marines on the islands, the closest British military unit was the HMS 
Endurance 400 NM away.118 
At 2300 on 1 April, 92 Argentinian marines left the destroyer Santisima 
Trinidad, to land on the extreme eastern portion of East Falkland Island, 
approximately three kilometers south of Stanley. Having landed unopposed, 
they marched overland to neutralize the Royal Marines posted three 
kilometers west of Stanley and then proceeded on to Stanley.119 
Following this landing, at 0400, the submarine Santa Fe dropped off 
frogmen north of Stanley to act as a beach reconnaissance party in support of 
the main landing force, the 2d Marine Battalion, which disembarked from 
Cabo San Antonio at 0600. This unit secured the airfield and advanced 
toward Stanley from the east.120 The action of the two landing parties acted as 
a pincer on the capital while sealing the withdrawal routes of the defenders. 
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By 0800 Stanley was secured and the junta announced at 1120 that the 
British governor, Rex Hunt, had surrendered unconditionally.121 As the blue 
and white banner of the Argentine Republic flew over Stanley, all that was 
left to do was secure other important geographic points on the islands, such as 
Goose Green, Darwin, and Port Fox. By afternoon marines were loaded on 
transports and returned to mainland bases.122 The Argentinians had carried 
out Operation Azul with clock-like precision. "Mision cumplida."123 
Deployment and Buildup (3-30 April) 
In Britain, Parliament was recalled on 3 April for the first Saturday session 
in over 20 years. Prime Minister Thatcher called the session to inform the 
House of Commons of the situation in the South Atlantic, to announce the 
government's decision to reclaim the islands, and to inform the full 
Parliament and public of the measures already taken by the prime minister 
prior to the session.124 The British soon thereafter initiated Operation 
Corporate to retake the Falklands and placed Adm Sir John Fieldhouse in 
command of all British forces in the South Atlantic. Rear Adm Sir John 
Woodward would command naval Task Force 318 and serve as naval 
commander for the operation. The air and land forces of Admiral Fieldhouse's 
Operation Corporate would be commanded by Royal Air Force Air Marshal 
Sir John Curtis and Royal Marine Maj Gen Jeremy Moore, respectively.125 On 
5 April the first of many deployments began when the aircraft carriers 
Invincible and Hermes departed Portsmouth with supporting ships including 
the civilian liner Canberra, that would serve as a troop and hospital ship.126 
Probably the most important development during the British deployment 
period was the 7 April announcement by Secretary of State for Defense John 
Nott that "From 0400 Greenwich Mean Time on Monday 12 April 1982, a 
maritime exclusion zone will be established around the Falkland Islands. The 
outer limit of this zone is a circle of 200 nautical mile radius. . . . From the 
time indicated, any Argentine warships and Argentine naval auxiliaries found 
within this zone will be treated as hostile and are liable to be attacked by 
British Forces."127 The announcement of the maritime exclusion zone (MEZ) 
was reinforced by an official British communique on midday 12 April 
announcing that the MEZ had been established as planned and that no 
Argentine warships or auxiliaries had been reported in the zone to that 
time.128 
This move weakened the Argentine buildup.129 Two British nuclear 
submarines, Spartan and Splendid, had sailed toward the South Atlantic on 1 
April in anticipation of the Argentine invasion and were on station by 12 April 
when the MEZ went into effect. What the Argentines did not know was that 
British submarine commanders had not received permission to attack ships, 
because the Thatcher government hoped that negotiations to persuade the 
Argentines to withdraw from the islands might still succeed. Therefore, the 
establishment of the MEZ was largely a bluff. However, the Argentine 
leadership would not risk the navy and was compelled to supply their troops 
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on the islands mostly by air. Few Argentine ships sailed for the islands and 
fewer made the return trip, most being stranded in Stanley after hostilities 
began.130 One of the ships that never arrived was Ciudad de Cordoba. It con- 
tained air defense weapons systems and ordnance as well as aluminum runway 
matting intended to extend the Stanley runway and allow the Argentinians to 
deploy their high-performance fighters forward from their continental 
bases.131 This would have effectively doubled the reach of Argentine fighters 
and thereby limited British reach by forcing the carriers to operate at or 
beyond the extreme limits of Harrier capabilities to cover any landings. 
The Argentinians established an "air bridge" across the MEZ to supply 
their units on the islands. They used every available transport, including 
aircraft of their international and domestic airlines. By the end of April they 
had flown over five hundred sorties, delivering 10,700 troops, and fifty-five 
hundred tons of cargo, mostly weapons and ammunition. However, the 
Argentinians could not satisfy their military needs on the island from air 
means alone and the defenders faced severe shortages of food and equipment 
when the British attacked.132 
During the remainder of the period, the Argentinians redeployed units on 
the mainland, conscripted recruits, and continued supply of the islands.133 The 
British spent the period planning, positioning equipment at their staging base 
on Ascension Island, and training for invasion.134 By Friday 30 April it was 
clear that negotiations were failing. Britain announced that the MEZ would 
become a total exclusion zone (TEZ), with aircraft as well as ships liable to 
attack. Britain prepared the way for the announcement with a note delivered 
by the Swiss Embassy in Buenos Aires to the Argentines on 23 April. It read 
as follows: "Her Majesty's Government now wishes to make it clear that any 
approach on the part of Argentine warships, including submarines, naval 
auxiliaries, or military aircraft, which could amount to threat to interfere 
with the mission of the British Forces in the South Atlantic will encounter the 
appropriate response. All Argentine aircraft including civil aircraft engaging 
in surveillance of these British Forces will be regarded as hostile and are 
liable to be dealt with accordingly."135 The main implication of the warning 
was that any ship or aircraft approaching the TEZ might be attacked if it was 
considered a threat to the British military units in the South Atlantic. This 
clearly had implications for the sinking of the General Beigrano on 2 May. 
Although the Argentines understood the intent of the message, they believed 
it might be a means to prepare the ground for air attacks on mainland air 
bases.136 In response the Argentines deployed antiaircraft artillery units to Rio 
Grande air base to protect their Exocet-capable Super Etendard aircraft.137 
The stage was set for the Battle of 1 May. 
The Battle of 1 May 
The day of 1 May was dedicated almost exclusively to air operations. It 
began with a predawn attack by a single Vulcan bomber which dropped 21 
one thousand-pound bombs on the Stanley (renamed Puerto Argentina) 
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airfield. The mission of 3,750 miles required in-flight refueling from 11 Victor 
tankers on both its inbound and outbound legs. The results of the Vulcan 
mission received criticism when it was learned the bombs were released late 
and only one bomb actually hit the runway, destroying a single Pucard 
ground attack aircraft.138 However, a critical aspect of the mission was 
overlooked by many observers. If the Argentinians ever planned to recover the 
runway matting from the hold of Ciudad de Cordoba to extend the Stanley 
runway for their high-performance fighters, the Vulcan raid ensured the 
Argentinians would not reconsider the matter.139 
The British followed the Vulcan attack with Harrier attacks on the airfields 
at Stanley and Goose Green (renamed Condor), approximately 50 miles from 
Stanley. The attack flight was launched from Hermes, while escorts were 
launched from Invincible. Strategic surprise was lost with the early morning 
Vulcan raid. Although the Harrier counterair attacks achieved a measure of 
tactical surprise, the attacks did little damage to the airfields.140 It was during 
these attacks that the first aerial engagements occurred. 
As aircraft from Invincible flew cover for the attackers, they were engaged 
by Dagger (an unlicensed Israeli version of the French Mirage V) aircraft from 
high altitude. However, the Daggers fired their missiles out of range. The 
results of this limited engagement were inconclusive, since the Harriers 
would not climb and the Daggers would not descend. Both flights disengaged, 
returned to base, and the first aerial kills came in the afternoon.141 Ironically, 
this was the only day during which the Argentinians configured their Daggers 
exclusively for air-to-air combat.142 
During the late afternoon the British positioned the destroyer Glamorgan, 
and the frigates Arrow and Alacrity south of Stanley for a naval 
bombardment of the airfield.143 The purpose of the shelling was to make the 
Argentinians believe the British were preparing for imminent amphibious 
landings.144 As the British began the bombardment, the Argentinians attacked 
the naval force and damaged Arrow slightly. Although the Argentinians 
claimed to have severely damaged four ships, Arrow was the only ship 
damaged during the attack.145 
During the ship attacks, Argentinian aircraft were engaged by Harriers 
from Invincible. Two Daggers and one Canberra bomber were shot down by 
the British with AIM-9L all-aspect infrared missiles. One Dagger was 
apparently shot down by Argentinian antiaircraft fire from Stanley.146 The 
Argentinians confirmed the loss of only two Daggers in the engagements, but 
claimed seven Harrier kills.147 The Argentinians downed no British aircraft 
during the engagements and were surprised to see the AIM-9L in combat. The 
significance of the AIM-9L was the influence it had on future air operations. 
The Argentinians found the missile impossible to evade. They were already 
limited to less than five minutes engagement time due to the range of their 
bases from the action. Operating at the extremity of their range and faced 
with an all-aspect missile threat, the Argentinians had no fuel reserve to out 
maneuver the Harriers for a successful engagement. This dilemma forced the 
Argentine leadership to make the British fleet the sole focus of their air 
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forces. They decided to configure all Argentine aircraft for attack and waive 
any requirement for air superiority during operations.148 The decision, 
arguably correct given the situation, subsequently proved deadly to Argentine 
pilots and aircrews. 
Attrition (2-20 May) 
Sinking of General Belgrano. On 2 May the General Belgrano sailed its 
last mission as it patrolled with two escorts, Hipolito Bouchard and Piedra 
Buena, between the Isla de la Estados and Burdwood Bank southwest of the 
Falklands. The main Argentine task force, with the carrier, Veinticinco de 
Mayo, was north of the Falklands and had attempted an air strike on the 
British task force at dawn. However, it aborted the operation when 
insufficient winds prevented takeoff from the carrier. The mission of General 
Belgrano, to the south, was to prevent any British warships from joining the 
British task force from the Pacific and to provide warning of any British 
movement towards the mainland.149 The previous day Admiral Allara had 
ordered General Belgrano to pose a lateral threat so as to force the enemy to 
divide, and not to approach the exclusion zone or engage the enemy without 
further authorization. Additionally, it shared orders with the rest of the 
Argentine fleet to intercept enemy units that were damaged, isolated, or 
separated from the main British naval force if the opportunity emerged.150 
Operating in the area was the British submarine, Conquerer, which had 
been sent there to search for General Belgrano and attack it when it entered 
the TEZ. After making contact with the Argentine ships in early morning of 2 
May, Conquerer began to trail General Belgrano and requested permission to 
attack.151 With task forces north and south of the British naval operating area, 
the British feared the Argentinians were attempting a pincer movement that 
could result in an Argentine surface-to-surface Exocet missile attack.152 
Adding to British concern was the fact that Veinticinco de Mayo was 
apparently attempting an offensive and the British submarine in the area, 
Splendid, was unable to make contact with the Argentine carrier.153 At 1730 
Conquerer acknowledged receipt of the attack message and signaled its 
intention to engage. At 2000 Conquerer was in position and attacked General 
Belgrano, which went down, taking the lives of 323 sailors.154 Aware of 
international concern over the attack on General Belgrano, on 7 May the 
British announced the TEZ would extend to 12 miles from the Argentine 
coast, effective 9 May. After General Belgrano was sunk, no major Argentine 
warship ventured beyond the 12 mile limit.155 
Revenge on Sheffield. The morning of 4 May began with a Vulcan bomber 
attack on the Stanley airfield.156 At 0944 a flight of two Super Etendard 
aircraft of the 2d Naval Air Squadron scrambled after an Argentine C-130 
crew reported British ships 75 NM south southeast of Stanley. After refueling 
on a KC-130 tanker, the flight eased below dense cloud cover and broke out 
over choppy seas, with limited visibility due to scattered clouds and rain. As 
the flight lead, Lt Cmdr Augusto Bedacarratz, and his wingman dropped 
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down to sea level, they found the ships on radar and headed straight for them. 
Skimming over the white caps, both pilots locked on to a large target and 
fired Exocets approximately 25 NM from the British ships.157 
Among those ships was Sheffield, performing radar picket duty for the 
main Invincible carrier task force. Sheffield, a poor substitute for an airborne 
early warning (AEW) system, had been receiving false returns on its radar 
scope during its watch.158 As Coventry and Sheffield discussed the technical 
problem one Exocet hit Sheffield at midship, tearing into the ship's fuel tanks 
and filling the ship with dense smoke. Because of the radar problem, Sheffield 
apparently did not realize it was under attack and never knew what hit it. 
After fighting fires for four hours, with no result, the captain ordered the ship 
abandoned.159 It sank, under tow, a week later outside the combat area.160 
Having fired two, the Argentinians had three Exocet missiles remaining.161 
After the exchange of Sheffield for General Belgrano the war moved to a 
crucial phase. The British Admiralty calculated the fleet was more at risk 
from Argentine airpower than from the navy. The threat the Exocet posed to 
the British fleet had a significant impact on the rest of the campaign, 
including naval air operations, task force positioning and maneuver, and the 
landings to come.162 
Other actions. During the remainder of the period the British brought 24 
additional Harrier aircraft into theater. However, the British lost two 
Harriers and a Sea King helicopter in noncombat accidents. Furthermore, the 
British naval vessels Broadsword and Glasgow were damaged when bombs 
struck both ships and failed to detonate. Finally, the Argentinians lost three 
A-4 aircraft in combat and the transport Islas de Los Estados to gunfire from 
Alacrity.163 As efforts for a negotiated solution failed, both sides planned and 
waited for the war to move to the beachhead. 
Landings and Breakout (21-25 May) 
British planners had to answer three basic questions concerning a landing 
in the Falklands: When? Where? How? The easiest question to answer was 
"When?" The British believed the only advantage in delay would have been if 
the Argentine air forces suffered high attrition at the hands of Admiral 
Woodward's forces. However, the attrition rates believed to be necessary had 
clearly not happened. The Argentine air forces were intact and the British 
were frustrated because they had not successfully drawn them out.164 In fact, 
only 16 Argentine fighter sorties were flown in combat from 5 May to D day 
on the Falklands.165 Because of the Argentine air forces' low attrition and 
fears that the sortie rates that Invincible and Hermes could sustain would 
diminish around 1 June (after a full month of intensive carrier flight 
operations), Admiral Woodward was concerned that he could not provide air 
superiority for the landings. He therefore believed the landings should occur 
as soon as possible to limit the size of the Argentine buildup and to avoid the 
risk of a long land campaign in the South Atlantic, where winter would test 
the ability of supporting ships to stay at sea and sustain the operation.166 
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While determining when to attack was relatively easy, deciding where to 
attack was more difficult. Argentinian defenders were concentrated around 
Stanley, and therefore everyone agreed that an opposed landing near Stanley 
should be avoided. This led to friction between the requirements of the 
landing forces that wanted a short approach to Stanley and short lines of 
communication, and the requirement for the naval forces to have a relatively 
safe anchorage protected from both bad weather and air attack. As a result, 
many landing sites were considered during the planning phase. All possible 
landing sites on West Falkland were quickly ruled out.167 Militarily, a landing 
on West Falkland would place British forces closer to Argentinian mainland 
air bases and further from their objective of Stanley. Furthermore, it would 
require an additional amphibious landing across Falkland Sound to reach 
East Falkland. 
Eventually, the conflict between land and naval requirements was settled 
in favor of naval forces. San Carlos was chosen for the amphibious landing for 
three reasons. First, it offered a good anchorage that could be protected 
against submarine attack. Second, the area around San Carlos was lightly 
defended and would be difficult for the Argentinians to reinforce quickly. 
Third, the low hills surrounding the inlet and anchorage provided reasonably 
good protection from sea-skimming Exocet attack.168 
How to attack posed some problems for the British who had not 
performed an amphibious operation at brigade strength since the operation 
to retake the Suez Canal in 1956.169 The landing would be in a lightly 
defended area, but local British air superiority was in doubt. Planners were 
told neither Invincible nor Hermes could be brought in shore and made 
available as helicopter platforms. They both would remain at sea to provide 
Harrier cover for the landings.170 As a result, the decision to keep the 
carriers at sea constrained the number of helicopters available for the 
landings. Because the planners could not ensure local air superiority, they 
decided that the initial landings should be made under cover of darkness 
using landing craft only. The landing craft were tasked to place four 
infantry units and all available tanks ashore before dawn. After dawn the 
artillery, air defense units, and stores would be brought ashore by 
helicopter and all available landing craft.171 
At 0250 on 21 May, Argentine soldiers spotted five vessels threading their 
way through San Carlos Strait. The naval gunfire intended to soften the 
beachhead, the increased air sortie rate over the area, and the harassment of 
Darwin by special forces were signs the Argentinians understood signaled an 
imminent British landing.172 In early action the British took Fanning Head, 
the high ground overlooking San Carlos, and raided the airfield at Goose 
Green.173 By day's end the beachheads around the towns of Port San Carlos 
and San Carlos were secured, and no Argentine ground action against the 
landing force had been reported.174 
The Argentine air reaction was slow. Initially, the only air units to engage 
the San Carlos landing force came from the Falklands, with Pucara and 
MB-339 attack aircraft the first on the scene.175 As the day wore on, the 
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Argentine air forces rose to the occasion and attacked British ships providing 
supporting fire for the landing force. At approximately 1400, Daggers from 
Naval Air Group 6 attacked the frigate, Ardent.116 Ardent was seriously 
damaged by a one thousand-pound bomb that struck the engine compartment 
of the ship.177 This attack was followed by two subsequent A-4 attacks at 
approximately 1445 and 1500.178 Ardent, ablaze, without engine power, was 
abandoned and sank.179 
Other British ships were damaged during the first day of operations off San 
Carlos. Both Argonaut and Antrim were seriously damaged when hit by one 
thousand-pound bombs which failed to detonate. Additionally, Broadsword 
and Brilliant suffered minor damage from strafing attacks.180 During the day, 
however, the Argentinians lost 16 fixed-wing aircraft and four helicopters 
while attacking British shipping.181 
During a lull in the air war on 22 May, the British consolidated their 
position on the island. However, the following day the frigate Antelope, sister 
ship of Ardent, suffered serious damage from A-4 aircraft of the Argentine air 
force and navy. Antelope was hit by two bombs that failed to explode and 
lodged in the engine room. As the British worked to defuse the bombs, one 
bomb detonated and the ship burnt and sank.182 
The next two days, 24 and 25 May, brought more British ship losses. Three 
ships, Sir Lancelot and Sir Galahad, of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary and the 
frigate Broadsword were hit by one thousand-pound bombs that failed to 
detonate. Additionally, the destroyer Coventry, sister ship of Sheffield, went 
down after being hit by three 1,000-pound bombs. Finally, and maybe more 
important, the container ship Atlantic Conveyor was hit by an Exocet and 
sank five days later.183 With Atlantic Conveyor the British lost three Chinook 
helicopters, capable of carrying 80 troops each; six Wessex-5 support 
helicopters; two Lynx helicopters; tents to accommodate four thousand troops; 
mobile landing strips for Harriers; and a water desalination plant. One 
Chinook was airborne and survived to give invaluable support to later 
operations.184 The loss of the Chinooks that were to play a crucial role in the 
land war, severely limited mobility of British land forces.185 
Since the start of action at San Carlos, seven British ships were damaged 
and four sunk from Argentine air forces. Many of the damaged ships survived 
only because Argentine bombs had not fuze-armed by impact and, therefore, 
failed to detonate. However, the British aircraft carriers were yet untouched. 
The Harrier force, reinforced by Atlantic Conveyor before it sank, was 
stronger than ever.186 While the British had lost only one Harrier along with 
the helicopters on Atlantic Conveyor, the Argentinians had lost 30 fixed-wing 
and six rotary-wing aircraft.187 
On land, while Argentine air forces attacked British naval forces, no 
Argentine ground forces counterattacked the British beachhead. In fact, 
the Argentine air forces were the only Argentine forces to attack the 
British beachhead with any strength. Even though Argentinian forces had 
not engaged the British to dislocate the landings at San Carlos, the 
Thatcher government, influenced by domestic public opinion, considered it 
30 
essential that the British engage Argentinian land forces at the earliest 
opportunity. As a result, the British landing force, which lacked extensive 
logistic support at the end of an immensely long line of communication, was 
pressured to conduct a land operation that the on-scene military command 
considered strategically irrelevant. Furthermore, while they conducted the 
required operation, the British would have to consolidate the beachhead with 
a single helicopter and a few landing craft, while preparing for the march 
across East Falkland to secure their ultimate objective, Stanley.188 The 
damage inflicted on the British navy during the phase was a great morale 
boost for the Argentine forces, who understood the attacks would slow the 
British buildup. Additionally, the attacks had an influence on the Thatcher 
government's decision to demand a quick confrontation with the Argentinians 
that threatened to prolong the campaign to regain the Falklands. 
Nonetheless, 25 May marked the end of a phase and the nature of the war 
was about to change as the British strove to produce some evidence of success. 
The Advance on Darwin and Goose Green (26-29 May) 
By the end of 25 May the British had five thousand men and five thousand 
tons of ordnance and supplies ashore. The loss of Atlantic Conveyor caused 
the British to rethink their plan for land operations. The plan initially called 
for a rapid single thrust across the island from San Carlos to Stanley. The 
British planned to take advantage of the speed and maneuver of the 
helicopters expected from Atlantic Conveyor to "invest the Stanley defenses in 
one bound."189 Without the helicopters, the British resurrected an earlier plan, 
calling for the 2d Parachute Regiment (2d Para) to raid Goose Green, south of 
San Carlos. In the meantime, other units would start pushing east, on foot, 
toward Stanley.190 
Late on 26 May, 2d Para moved toward the Darwin Isthmus. The first 
contact with Argentine troops did not occur until the afternoon of 27 May 
when a British reconnaissance patrol engaged in a firefight with Argentine 
troops. The Argentinians, quickly outflanked and having no communications 
to request fire support, were overwhelmed. To make matters worse for the 
Argentinians, the leader of their unit was taken prisoner by the British. 
During interrogation, the British learned the Darwin garrison was much 
stronger than expected.191 
By early morning 28 May, the Argentinians had reinforced their positions 
in Goose Green by helicopter and 2d Para was ready to attack. With 
information obtained from the Argentine prisoner, the British decided to 
advance south with C Company and overrun defensive positions in night 
actions. Following companies would mop-up during daylight hours to avoid 
civilian casualties.192 At 0200 28 May, 2d Para began the attack on Darwin 
with supporting naval gunfire and Harrier air support. The Argentines 
offered staunch resistance, but were pushed out of their positions and into the 
settlement. The Argentines surrendered Darwin that afternoon and 2d Para 
pushed on to Goose Green.193 The Argentinians were well dug in at Goose 
31 
Green and bitter fighting continued into the night. Both sides received air 
support during the battle. The British sent two Argentine prisoners of war 
through the lines to open negotiations with the Argentines. At first the 
Argentines balked at negotiation. As the British reinforced their positions 
with artillery, they threatened a major demonstration of firepower and more 
Harrier attacks if the Argentinians did not surrender. At 1100 29 May the 
last Argentinian troops surrendered to the British.194 The British took over 
one thousand prisoners, including 120 Argentinian wounded, while sustaining 
casualties of 12 killed and 31 wounded themselves.195 
The British victories at Darwin and Goose Green secured the British 
southern flank and lines of communications to the beachhead at San Carlos. 
Additionally, the victories gave the British an opportunity to assess the 
fighting qualities of the Argentinians. Finally, they gave the British ground 
forces a definite psychological advantage over the Argentinians, particularly 
after the British announced that a regiment of five hundred men defeated 
over fifteen hundred defenders to take Goose Green.196 The British were now 
ready to make a two-pronged advance on Stanley. 
The Advance on Stanley (27 May-14 June) 
On 27 May, while 2d Para advanced on Darwin-Goose Green, the 3d 
Marine Commando Brigade's, 45th Royal Marine Commando (45 Cmdo) and 
the 3d Parachute Regiment (3d Para) marched northeast from the San Carlos 
beachhead to Douglas. They then marched southeast to the Teal Inlet, a 
50-mile journey over rough terrain in inhospitable weather, and secured the 
area on 30 May.197 Meanwhile, on 28 May a small force of Special Air Service 
(SAS) troops had been dropped by helicopter on Mount Kent, 10 miles west of 
Stanley, to secure a landing zone for follow-on troops. The SAS troops were 
joined by the 42d Royal Marine Commando (42 Cmdo) and a supporting light 
artillery unit on 1 June to establish control over the western approaches to 
Stanley. Both units were airlifted by helicopter to the objective area.198 
During this time General Moore assumed direct control of all land 
operations and began a series of troop movements to press on quickly with the 
advance on Stanley. On 1 June the Fifth Infantry Brigade (5 Bde), composed 
of Scots Guards, Welsh Guards, and Gurkha Rifles, began landing at San 
Carlos. Additionally, when the Argentinians had abandoned Fitzroy, a town 
18 miles southwest of Stanley, Moore ordered 2d Para to secure the town.199 
Fitzroy was important to Moore's plan to take Stanley. 
On 4 June, Moore started moving elements of the 5 Bde, by sea, to positions 
in the Fitzroy-Cove Bluff area. The first troops arrived on 6 June and 
continued disembarkation through 8 June. The loss of the Chinook helicopters 
on Atlantic Conveyor had precluded airlifting the bulk of 5 Bde to the area. 
Therefore, the British reasoned that sealift was the only means available to 
move forward quickly and maintain the tempo of operations, while 
minimizing the risk of an Argentinian counterattack.200 The loss of helicopter 
lift subsequently proved costly to British shipping. 
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The morning of 8 June found the cargo ship Sir Galahad, her sister ship 
Sir Tristram, and the frigate Plymouth south of Fitzroy in Pleasant Bay. The 
cargo ships were unloading supplies and ordnance in broad daylight when 
operations were hindered by Argentine air forces. A-4 aircraft arrived before 
the Rapier surface-to-air missile system, designated to protect the ships, was 
operational.201 During the attack, Sir Galahad was hit by the flight leader's 
bombs, which tore through the ship's mess and exploded. Other aircraft 
attacked while secondary explosions erupted from the ordnance onboard. One 
pilot's attack was long and his bombs flew over Sir Galahad, ricocheted on the 
water, and slithered on the beach where they hit a Rapier air defense 
system's fuel tanks, causing a large blast with several secondary explosions.202 
Sir Galahad, mortally wounded, was subsequently scuttled. Meanwhile, Sir 
Tristram was damaged by another flight of A-4 aircraft, but did not sink. 
Finally, the frigate Plymouth suffered damage when it was hit by four bombs 
which failed to detonate. However, one bomb hit a depth charge, starting a 
fire that was extinguished within an hour.203 Argentine airpower, thought to 
be severely diminished from previous operations, dealt a severe blow felt by 
the landing force, the logistics capability needed for the final push to Stanley, 
and the government in London. 
By 10 June, the British had taken the high ground surrounding Stanley 
and, the next day began an artillery bombardment to prepare for the final 
Battle for Stanley. Royal Marines launched a night attack on three Argentine 
strong points: Mount Longdon, Two Sisters, and Mount Harriet. Despite 
tactical surprise, resistance was substantial at Mount Longdon on the north 
flank and Two Sisters in the center. Mount Harriet, enveloped from the rear, 
fell quickly. During the night of 11-12 June, HMS Glamorgan became the last 
British ship to come under direct attack during the war when a land based 
Exocet struck and damaged the ship, but failed to knock it out of action.204 
A second phase of the Battle for Stanley took place on 13-14 June. Second 
Para made a night assault on Wireless Ridge three miles east of Mount 
Longdon. To the south, a battalion of Scots Guards took Tumbledown 
Mountain after a hard fight with Argentine marines. Gurkhas then passed 
through the Scots Guards to take Mount William, less than four miles from 
Stanley. A planned third phase of the operation proved unnecessary as 
Argentinian resistance collapsed. On 14 June the Argentine military 
governor, Gen Mario Benjamin Menendez, surrendered the Falklands to 
General Moore.205 The British had successfully carried out a very difficult 
operation, on short notice, over very long lines of communications. 
Analysis—South Atlantic War 
Determining the Central Element 
Operation Azul. The Argentinians planned the invasion of the Falklands 
as an amphibious operation and it clearly called for naval transport to deliver 
the landing force to the islands. Additionally, the Argentinians did not use 
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their air forces during the invasion until late in the afternoon when some of 
the invading marines were transported back to their mainland bases. 
Although the Argentinians understood the importance of the airfield, making 
it a primary objective of the operation, the 2d Marine Battalion was the main 
instrument used to take the airfield and occupy Stanley. As a result, the 
amphibious landing force was the central element of the phase (table 3). Both 
naval and air forces supported land forces during Operation Blue. 
Deployment and Buildup. During this phase the combatants made 
different elements central to their campaigns. The Argentinians made 
airpower central to their buildup and deployment to the Falklands as they 
prepared to defend against an anticipated British invasion. Although 
airpower ;vas crucial to the Argentinian effort, the decision they made in 
establishing the "air bridge" to the Falklands was essentially imposed by the 
British when they announced the establishment of the MEZ. British sea 
power influenced future Argentinian air operations when Ciudad de Cordoba 
failed to deliver runway matting intended to extend the Stanley airfield for 
high-performance jet fighters. Sea power was central when the British 
dispatched the submarines Spartan and Splendid to the South Atlantic in 
anticipation of hostilities and, later, when the British formed and deployed 
their naval task force. Taken as whole, the central element of this phase was 
sea power, which influenced air operations and the Argentinian decision to 
make airpower central to their operations. 
The Battle of 1 May. As a phase devoted exclusively to air operations, this 
phase was clearly air central. The initial counterair missions on Stanley and 
Table 3 
Determining the Central Element—South Atlantic 
^Phases                        Elements-* Air Land Sea 
Operation Azul • 
Deployment and Buildup • 
Battle of 1 May • 
Attrition • 
Landings and Breakout • 
Darwin/Goose Green • 
Stanley • 
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Goose Green airfields along with the first aerial engagements set the stage for 
future operations. Compelling the Argentine air forces to operate from 
mainland bases over 450 miles from the objective area weakened the overall 
Argentinian air effort. The Harrier advantage in missile technology 
influenced Argentine air operations, forcing the Argentinians to make all 
fighters attack aircraft and abandon any ideas of gaining air superiority for 
their operations. 
Attrition. The single most dramatic event during this phase was 
Conquerer's attack on General Belgrano. However, taken as a whole, airpower 
had more influence during this phase and more influence on future 
operations. The successful Argentinian attack on Sheffield forced the British 
to withdraw their aircraft carriers well to the east of the Falklands, beyond 
the reach of Argentine air forces. Nonetheless, the British air forces were able 
to operate from locations closer to the objective area, while maintaining their 
distance from Argentine air forces. However, the British still believed 
Argentinian airpower posed the most significant threat to their forces. But, by 
posting their carriers to the east, the British were not able to place combat air 
patrols (CAP) between the Falklands and the mainland. The loss of such a 
fighter screen allowed more Argentine aircraft to attack the shipping 
supporting the San Carlos landings. As a result, British air operations, build 
up of supplies ashore, task force maneuver, and the planning and execution of 
the San Carlos landings were all influenced by Argentine air. 
Landings and Breakout. This phase was similar to the deployment and 
buildup phase because each combatant used a different element as a 
predominant part of their operations. However, airpower was central to the 
phase. In fact, the British landings were opposed by Argentine air forces only. 
Argentine airpower also influenced both British planning and execution of the 
landings at San Carlos. The British, concerned with Argentine airpower chose 
San Carlos, in large part, because it provided some protection against Exocet 
attack. Additionally, fear of Argentine air attack kept the British carriers 
from the landing area, which made British air superiority for the landings 
doubtful. Furthermore, Argentine airpower threatened to stall the British 
invasion on the beach when air attacks damaged seven British ships and 
destroyed four others supporting the landings. As a result, the landings were 
sustained, for a time, by a single helicopter and a few landing craft. 
Advance on Darwin and Goose Green. Although 2d Para was 
supported by both naval gunfire and Harrier attack aircraft, land forces were 
central to this phase. The British needed a victory to secure the British 
southern flank and to boost morale after the Argentinian air successes 
against British shipping. Second Para captured Darwin, Goose Green, and 
Goose Green airfield to secure the British flank for the capture of Stanley. In 
addition, they gained a psychological advantage over Argentinian land forces 
by fighting outnumbered and winning. 
Advance on Stanley. Both airpower and sea power supported land 
operations by providing land forces with tactical mobility, operational 
maneuver, and firepower. However, the offensive by Royal Marine and British 
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army units was central to the final phase of the campaign. Argentine forces 
concentrated around Stanley had to be defeated and expelled if the British 
were to regain sovereignty over the islands. The efforts of land forces allowed 
the British to conclude the war by reclaiming the Falklands. 
Analyzing Conditions When Sea and Land Forces Were Central 
As with the previous Guadalcanal analysis, the purpose of this section is to 
determine what conditions existed to make a particular element either central 
or supporting (table 4). Again the five conditions considered in expanded 
analysis are function, environment, topography, forces, and capabilities. The 
central elements of each South Atlantic phase were identified in table 3. Of 
the seven phases identified in the South Atlantic, sea power was central in 
one phase and land forces were central in three. 
Sea. The deployment and buildup phase was different from the only sea 
power central phase during the Guadalcanal campaign. The conditions 
present during the south Atlantic sea central phase were also present in other 
phases. Additionally, it was the longest phase of the South Atlantic War. 
Furthermore, it was a sea versus air phase in which sea power prevailed. It 
was a phase during which Argentine perceptions of British strategic naval 
reach had a great influence on, both, the phase and preparations for future 
operations. 
The perceptions of British naval reach allowed the British to prevail in the 
only phase devoted exclusively to sea control. The British, after announcing 
the establishment of the MEZ, which at first was largely a bluff, were able to 
control the size and intensity of the Argentine buildup from afar. Finally, the 
capabilities of sea power made an enormous impact on events. Specifically, 
range, mass, maneuver, and persistence allowed the British to prevail in the 
only nonlethal phase, during which no fire was exchanged. 
Land. Land forces were central in three of the seven phases identified. The 
conditions under which land power was central showed a high degree of 
similarity between phases. However, there were conditions such as the 
environment and topography, which varied significantly during the phases. 
The environment in which land forces were central was highly variable. 
There were no exclusively daylight operations. In fact, most land operations 
began under cover of darkness. Clearly land operations were performed in 
varied climatic conditions, particularly in view of the severity of the weather 
in the South Atlantic. 
The topography associated with land central phases was also highly 
variable. Operation Azul was performed over sea, beaches, coastal plains, 
mountains, and urban settings. Both the advance on Goose Green and Stanley 
were fought over equally varied topography. Additionally, soldiers found the 
Falklands generally barren, with many wide, open areas making approach 
and closure with the enemy difficult. Cover and concealment was found in 
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Force composition of land central phases always involved elements of other 
forces. However, airpower was generally absent from Operation Azul. With 
that exception, air support for land operations was a prominent feature in 
operations at Goose Green and Stanley, providing lift and firepower to land 
forces. It was after the British threatened more Harrier strikes with artillery 
barrages that the Argentinians surrendered Goose Green. Additionally, sea 
power was used in all three land central campaigns. Clearly, sea power 
provided lift for Azul and the battle for Stanley. Finally, naval gunfire 
supported British land forces in both the Goose Green and Stanley phases. 
The function of land forces was similar during each phase in that each land 
central phase eventually called for close operations. This function is starkly 
different from the nonlethal sea central phase, in which sea control occurred 
from afar. Each land central phase was offensive in nature, with forced 
entries and offensives to capture important geographical points on the 
islands. 
In addition to the mass and persistence normally associated with land 
forces, land central phases were also characterized by a high degree of 
maneuver. Each phase involved operational maneuver including, air and 
naval lift, flanking maneuvers, and pincers to set the tempo of operations and 
control events on land. The British land central phases also integrated air and 
naval firepower with organic artillery to fix the enemy while land forces 
maneuvered for advantage. 
Airpower as the Central Element 
Airpower central phases appear to have somewhat stronger correlation 
among the conditions present during each phase than either sea or land 
central phases. Counterair operations were a part of each phase in which 
airpower was central. TASMO was a function performed in two of three air 
central phases. Although air central phases were conducted in variable 
environmental conditions, daylight operations were predominant during air 
phases. There appeared to be a chronological progression in the types of forces 
used in air central phases. The first air central phase was fought by air forces 
only. The second, attrition, saw both air versus air and air versus sea 
engagements. The final air central phase saw air, land, and sea forces 
involved. Air central phases were fought over vast ranges when speed to the 
objective area was vital to current operations. Finally, they were generally 
characterized by airpower's ability to bring mass with maneuver to the 
objective area for an immediate, but sometimes fleeting, impact on the 
campaign. 
The air central phases were conducted over all topography available within 
the theater, from open ocean to mountains within the interior of East 
Falkland. The reasons airpower was central over such varied topography are 
much the same as those reasons explained in the Guadalcanal analysis: 
speed, range, lack of adequate cover and concealment, consequential ease of 
target acquisition, and the tendency of air weapons to engage air weapons. 
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These factors, in addition to the topography around the Falklands, combined 
with the impact of both airpower and sea power had on operations and 
subsequent force deployments, can explain why air became central in the 
three middle phases of the campaign. 
First, Argentine concern over British sea power initially prevented the 
Argentinians from extending the runway at Stanley. Furthermore, 
Argentinian concern over British airpower, after the Vulcan attack of 1 May, 
ensured the runway would not be extended. Subsequent British concern over 
carrier vulnerability at the hands of Argentine airpower, particularly after 
Sheffield, persuaded the British to place Hermes and Invincible well to the 
east of the islands. This decision prevented the British from establishing 
CAPs between the Falklands and the Argentinian mainland to engage aircraft 
as they approached the Falklands. Without an effective air screen, aircraft 
from both forces, operating at or near the limits of their ranges, met over the 
Falklands. Topography prevented adequate dispersion of British shipping in 
and around San Carlos and Pleasant Bay. The concentration of British 
shipping in restricted waters effectively accentuated the mass and firepower 
of Argentine airpower and placed the British invasion in jeopardy. 
The preceding paragraph offered an explanation of why Argentine TASMO 
missions were effective. Another reason for Argentinian TASMO success can 
be explained by technology. All-weather flight instrumentation helped the 
Argentinians arrive at the target area in all types of environmental 
conditions. Additionally, the technology of the Exocet had dramatic 
consequences when it was successfully employed. However, most of the 
damage and destruction to British shipping came from gravity-drop bombs. 
The South Atlantic War further demonstrated the capability of airpower to 
bring speed, range, and mass with maneuver to a campaign. Although 
airpower is not normally associated with persistence, airpower in the South 
Atlantic had a persistent influence on operations. Although the action 
involving airpower was fleeting, its influence was pervasive. Airpower posed 
significant problems for British force planning, deployment, and employment. 
However, while Argentine air lift provided vital support to land forces, 
Argentine airpower was not as effective as British airpower in supporting 
land forces in combat. This may be explained by the fact that the Argentines 
used far less sophisticated weapon systems for close air support. 
Airpower Summary—South Atlantic 
Argentina never developed an appropriate strategy for the South Atlantic 
War and thereby placed too much of the burden on their air forces. The 
Argentinians adopted a very simple, but ultimately inadequate strategy: 
destroy British shipping. The use of high technology Exocets seemed to give 
the advantage to the offense over the defense. But the Exocets were best used 
with the element of surprise. None of the ships hit by Exocets appeared to be 
aware that they were under attack. Nonetheless, the Exocet, in effect, made 
the Argentine air forces larger than their numbers. 
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Likewise, the AIM-9L gave the Harriers a definite advantage in aerial 
combat, with 75 percent of the British kills directly attributable to the 
Sidewinder. Indeed, while the Harriers tallied an impressive number of kills, 
the British lost no Harriers to Argentine aircraft.206 As with the Exocet, the 
AIM-9L made the British air forces larger than their numbers. 
High technology weaponry allowed airpower to control its own element and 
influence sea and land power. However, on land, where the Argentines used 
less capable aircraft, results were not as impressive. The lack of capability 
possessed by Argentine close air support aircraft limited the environment in 
which they could operate, while diminishing accuracy and payload (mass). By 
neglecting the temporal, spatial, and force aspects of the principle of mass, 
the Argentines never gave airpower the opportunity to stop the British march 
across East Falkland. However, by adhering to those same aspects, the 
Argentines placed the British invasion on a very tenuous footing at San 
Carlos and Pleasant Bay. 
Conclusion 
Comparison of Conditions—Air Central Phases 
The Guadalcanal and South Atlantic campaigns were fought 40 years 
apart. In addition to the years, several generations of technology separated 
them as well. However, it is remarkable how similar the air central phases of 
each campaign were (table 5). Also similar is the way in which air, land, and 
sea forces interacted and found themselves, rather than independent military 
arms, interdependent, influencing each other. Indeed, the early airpower 
practitioner, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Arthur Tedder, recognized 
the interplay in 1946. In a lecture to the Royal United Service Institution, 
Marshal Tedder explained, "the operations of land, sea, and air forces are 
closely related. The relative size of forces and the relative scale of effort of 
those forces will vary in different campaigns and in different stages of each 
campaign. But whatever those variations, the operations in the three 
elements are inter-dependent." Tedder's insight is relevant to Guadalcanal, 
the South Atlantic, and any other joint campaign. 
Although, there were many similarities, differences were noted and should 
be highlighted. First, the Argentinians were not as successful at interdicting 
British shipping as the Allies were at interdicting Japanese shipping. This 
may seem to be a contradiction, particularly in light of the heavy damage 
done to British shipping at the hands of Argentine air. However, because 
Henderson Field was in Allied hands, Japanese shipping could be attacked at 
great range from Guadalcanal. Additionally, Henderson Field allowed 
airpower to project power forward and protect the American buildup on 
Guadalcanal. The failure of the Argentinians to improve the Stanley runway 
for high-performance aircraft severely limited Argentinian airpower's reach. 
It also meant that all TASMO and interdiction missions were flown from 
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aircraft flying fewer daily sorties than would have been possible from a 
developed Falklands air base. 
Therefore, the basing of aircraft played a significant role in both 
campaigns. Close proximity of air bases to the objective area means more 
firepower for the theater commander, with more flexibility in its application. 
However, if air bases are to be located close to the objective area, they must be 
protected by both active and passive air defense measures. 
Second, there were fewer aircraft involved in the South Atlantic than at 
Guadalcanal. However, British carrier strength near the Falklands was 
approximately the average Allied strength near Guadalcanal. The single 
Argentine carrier withdrew after an aborted attempt to launch an offensive 
against the British task force early in the campaign. Although the total 
numbers of aircraft participating were fewer in the Falklands, in general, 
they were more capable. Comparing the two campaigns in numbers, 
technology, and air results clearly demonstrates the meaning of the term force 
multiplier. The Exocet and AIM-9L made the Argentinian and British air 
forces, respectively, larger than their numbers. Additionally, flight 
instrumentation for all-weather flight allowed aircraft to function when those 
at Guadalcanal were grounded. However, weather still played an important 
role, with the most significant air operations conducted in daylight and visual 
conditions. 
Finally, the distance of the theater from the combatants' home and source 
of strength was another major difference. At Guadalcanal both the Japanese 
and Allies were many miles from their shores, but both set up logistics and 
staging bases relatively close to the objective area. However, in the South 
Atlantic, the Argentinians were close to the objective area and the British 
were forced to conduct offensive operations eight thousand miles from home, 
with the closest support base, Ascension, 3,750 miles away. The Argentinian 
failure to take advantage of Argentina's proximity to the Falklands (which 
was the result of a lack of serious thought and planning about what to do 
after the success of Operation Azul) resulted in the eventual defeat of 
Argentinian forces. 
Several similarities between the two campaigns are evident from an 
examination of table 5. First, as noted above, most air central phases were 
conducted in daylight, under visual conditions. Although the more modern 
aircraft in the South Atlantic campaign were able to fly in conditions that 
would having grounded aircraft at Guadalcanal, weather instrument 
conditions limited the effectiveness of airpower. This does not mean that 
airpower is not all-weather capable. But it does mean that planners must 
take prevailing weather conditions into account when planning to integrate 
airpower into a campaign. Although airpower may be able to fly, weather can 
still limit its effectiveness. For example, one may only look to Desert Storm to 
see the impact weather had on the operations of the most technologically 
advanced, all-weather air force ever assembled. In short, planners must 
understand exactly what air officers mean and the limitations involved when 
air weapon systems are described as "all-weather." 
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Additionally, this analysis found land forces involved in air central phases 
only once and all but one of the air central phases involved sea forces. From 
all phases surveyed and particularly, air central phases, air weapons 
appeared to achieve greater success against sea forces than against land 
forces. This fact does not imply air forces are superior to sea forces, nor does it 
imply that air forces should not be used to augment the organic firepower of 
land forces. This result may be reasonably explained by the contention that 
ship attacks are more suited to airpower and air weapons than attacks on 
land forces. Ships are relatively large, point targets; and, as such, they are 
easier to see and attack, once found. Consequently, the inherent 
maneuverability of aircraft tends to make ships easier targets against which 
to concentrate aerial firepower. Finally, ships tend to fail catastrophically 
when hit by concerted air attack. The lack of comparable success against land 
forces can be explained by the fact that land forces generally find it somewhat 
easier to take cover, conceal positions, and disperse. In contrast to ships, land 
forces, except in special circumstances, tend to fail incrementally rather than 
catastrophically. This leads one to conclude that airpower should not be the 
first weapon chosen to work the close-kill problem once close operations 
commence. If air weapons are to be more effective in that role, they must have 
better means to locate, target, and attack enemy land forces. Finally, the size 
of the islands did not allow for interdiction of land forces. Interdiction 
occurred at Guadalcanal; but sea forces were those interdicted, as the 
Japanese attempted to build their presence on the island. Had there been 
more opportunity for interdiction or battlefield air interdiction, it is possible 
the results of air versus land engagements may have been altered. 
Nevertheless, this analysis of two island campaigns showed air central phases 
involved land forces only once and point targets, such as ships, appeared to be 
more vulnerable to air weapons. 
Although the intent of this study is not to present evidence for or against 
sea-based airpower, some observations can be made. In general, aircraft 
carriers are only a viable weapon system to the nations that can afford to 
protect them. Admirals Fletcher, Nagumo, Allara, and Woodward were forced 
to withdraw their carriers from land objective areas to prevent their 
destruction. The need to defend them detracts from the carrier's overall 
offensive capability, by either forcing the carrier to conduct more defensive 
counterair operations or forcing a withdrawal beyond enemy air reach. 
Furthermore, carrier-based airpower at Guadalcanal found it increased its 
impact when operations were conducted, in part, from the "unsinkable 
aircraft carrier," Henderson Field. Nonetheless, carriers were indispensable to 
all but the Argentine effort, and, generally, land-based airpower is less 
effective than sea-based airpower when operating in central ocean areas. 
However, large air offensives, beyond the scope of raids, will generally require 
land-based air to generate the number of offensive sorties necessary for 
accomplishing offensive objectives. 
Finally, the capabilities airpower can bring to a campaign, particularly 
when augmented by precision, launch and leave, and stand-off weapons, are 
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speed, range, and mass with maneuver. There are, however, finite limits to 
airpower range, even with aerial refueling. Planners need to consider the 
placement of air bases within the theater to prevent airpower from operating 
at, or near, the extreme limits of its reach. Such a situation slows the tempo of 
air operations, reduces airpower's mass, diminishes airpower's operational 
maneuver, which diminishes the impact and influence airpower has on the 
campaign. In fact, some operations may require efforts to take and hold 
airfields. When the Japanese lost Henderson Field and the Argentines 
effectively lost Stanley Airport for fighter operations, they both lost the 
initiative in the campaign. Effective and secure basing, combined with high- 
technology weapons, gives airpower an influence on the campaign 
disproportionate to its numbers. Both combine to give airpower its unique 
capability to bring mass with maneuver to the campaign. When is airpower 
central to joint operations? When environmental and instrument conditions 
do not preclude air operations, and theater commanders require speed, range, 
and mass with maneuver against distinct, point targets where air weapons 
can be used most effectively. 
Having answered the research question, what practical guidelines can aid 
the campaign planner? The following are suggested. 
• Without some degree of air superiority, air forces cannot effectively assist 
land or sea forces, or strike an adversary to accomplish theater 
objectives. 
• Air forces should be based as far forward as practical in order to project 
power as far forward as possible. This gives airpower more reach, mass, 
and sortie capability in the objective area. Failure to secure adequate 
basing risks losing the initiative. 
• Air weapons described as "all-weather" have definite limitations which 
influence the conduct of operations. Planners should seek specific advice 
on air capabilities from air officers once the prevailing weather, 
environment, and topography within the theater of operations are 
known. 
• Airpower is generally better suited to engage definite point targets, 
rather than widely dispersed, nondescript targets. Consequently, 
airpower should not be the first weapon chosen to resolve the close-kill 
problem. 
• Air central phases are generally characterized by tactical and operational 
offensive operations—even when on the strategic defensive. As a result, 
airpower can be used effectively when employed offensively, to seek and 
close with the enemy beyond close operations range. 
• High-technology air weapons increase the impact of airpower 
disproportionately to its numbers. The air plan should give priority for 
such weapons to appropriate target sets that further the theater 
commander's objectives, while preventing indiscriminate use of such 
weapons. 
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• All the above should demonstrate that the operational orchestration of 
air, land, and sea forces for strategic effect is as important today as it 
ever has been. As a result, theater air operations require a well-reasoned 
air concept of operations to meet the needs of situation and accomplish 
theater objectives. 
Why should planners, particularly those who have land and sea expertise, 
concern themselves with the question of when airpower is central to the 
campaign? Marshal Tedder knew that "The first round in modern war takes 
place in the air—the fight for air superiority; and . . . the Air war is of vital 
importance to the operations at sea and on land. It is natural, and indeed, 
essential, that Sea and Land Commanders should take a very real interest in 
what air forces are doing—just as the Air Commander must know exactly 
what is happening on land and at sea. Plans should, in fact, be joint—a 
Land/Sea/Air Plan ... to gain [the] superiority . . . made possible only by 
unity."207 
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